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“Europe is facing a combination of skills shortages, bottlenecks 
and unemployment. ‘Mobile’ workers – people with experience of 
working in different countries or changing jobs – tend to be better at 
learning new skills and adapting to different working environments. 
If we want to see the number of workers in the right jobs envisaged 
by the EU growth and jobs strategy, we really need a more mobile 
workforce”. 
 
 
Vladimír Špidla, EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Europe is dealing with the growing challenges of globalisation, rapid 
technological change and a developing knowledge society. Greater labour mobility 
between regions and between jobs is a crucial element in order Europe to become a 
more competitive, flexible and adaptable economy. Mobility is crucial for the 
economy and employers, but it also offers huge benefits for individual workers.  
For the individual, moving country or region entails a complete change of social 
environment. It can mean a chance to learn new skills, have new life experiences and 
develop one’s career. However, it can also mean the loss of established social 
networks and of an established position in the former workplace, as well as the 
devaluation of company-specific skills. In addition to the effort involved in adapting 
to different social security, health and school systems, the migrant often has to 
simultaneously find a job and learn a new language. 
For the regions and the Member States experiencing inflows and outflows, greater 
mobility challenges social cohesion and economic performance: the hosting region 
gains new labour resources (a ‘brain gain’), but needs to integrate new workers and 
their families. The sending region often loses its most talented people (a ‘brain 
drain’), however, if return migration is well organised, it has the potential to result in 
a win–win situation for all parties in the long term.  
So in order to maximise the benefits arising from an integrated single labour 
market, Europe must balance the trade-offs that labour mobility creates. 
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2. ECONOMIC THEORIES FOR LABOUR MOBILITY 
The study of mobility - migration lies at the core of labor economics because the 
analysis of labor flows—whether within or across countries—is a central ingredient in 
any discussion of the labor market.  
2.1. Neoclassical Theories 
According to the neoclassical principals, the two factors who act in the labour 
market are the individuals/workers whose purpose is their utility-maximization and 
the employers who seek for profit-maximization. Through an “invisible hand,” 
workers who migrate, searching for better opportunities, accomplish a goal that no 
one in the economy had in mind: an efficient allocation of resources. And while in 
reality labour markets are imperfect, labour mobility is one of the mechanisms that is 
used in order to correct market imperfections and to lead to the labor market 
equilibrium. In other words in a competitive economy labour flows can improve labor 
market efficiency. 
As far as it may concern the costs and benefits that come from migration, the 
neoclassical theories of economic migration seem to offer some straightforward 
answers. According to the neo-classical theories, migration has an all-round beneficial 
effect, with gains for all, or nearly all, directly involved. The receiving country 
(assumed to have a labour shortage) gains as immigration removes labour scarcity, 
facilitates occupational mobility and reduces wage-push inflationary pressure, leading 
to fuller utilization of productive capital, increased exports and economic growth. For 
the sending country, emigration can reduce unemployment and boost economic 
growth through access to strategic inputs such as remittances and returning skills. The 
migrants, in turn, can benefit from higher wages and productivity in the capital-rich 
receiving country. The neoclassical theories also suggest that with wages rising in the 
sending country and falling in the receiving country, factor costs eventually become 
balanced, and migration between the two countries ceases1.  
                                                           
1http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/wmr_
sec02.pdf  
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One of the most well known neo-classical theories that interpreted the global 
migration as a part in the process of the economic development, was the homonym 
“theory of economic development”, which was initiated by Harris & Todaro2 in 1970 
and focuses to costs and benefits of the migration from one region to the other until 
the equalization of the expected labour utility between the two regions to be 
succeeded.  
2.2. International Trade Theories 
The question of factor (in particular labour) mobility forms an integral part of 
international trade theory. The theory of international trade was based on the 
Ricardian3 assumption that factors of production are mobile internally and immobile 
internationally, accepting only one factor of production, labour, to be necessary to 
produce goods and services. 
In “International Trade and Factor Mobility” (1957), Mundell demonstrates the 
substitutability of international trade and factor mobility. In the context of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson4 model that begins - based to the Ricardian model - with 
the assumption that labor is immobile across countries and mobile internally, the 
perfect factor mobility across sectors within an economy provides a tendency for 
commodity-price equalization, even in the absence of international trade in goods. 
This result complements the Stolper-Samuelson5 theorem, which demonstrates the 
tendency for factor-price equalization as a consequence of goods trade, even in the 
absence of international trade in factors. International factor mobility also serves as a 
substitute for trade in another sense in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) 
model, since an increase in the volume of factor movements can decrease the volume 
of trade. 
                                                           
2
 Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro. 1970. "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector 
Analysis." American Economic Review 60 (March), p. 126-142. 
3
 L. Karp, Ricardian model, International Trade, October 20, 2005. 
4
 http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch60/T60-0.php  
5
 http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch60/T60-0.php 
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According to international trade theories, a labour abundant country is exporting 
those goods that are relatively intensive in the production of labour, it is, in a sense, 
exporting labour. The export of  labor  intensive goods leads  to  the equalization of 
wage rates  across  countries  even  if  labor  itself  is  immobile. In other words, the 
trading of goods substitutes for the trading of people. 
2.3. Theories of Economic Migration 
Recent theoretical developments ignore the international trade aspects of labor 
migration and focus solely on the study of migration flows. They have borrowed, 
however, one of the key insights of the international migration literature: that there 
exists an "immigration market."6 In other words, just as goods are traded across 
international boundaries in the international goods market, people are also "traded" 
across the same boundaries in the immigration market.   
As reported previously, through migration labour can be "allocated" to different 
labour markets. The recent theories of immigration analyze the allocation of labor 
across international boundaries. These theories are based on the behavioral 
assumption that individuals migrate because it is in their benefit (either in terms of 
psychic satisfaction or income) to do so. Individual behavior, of course, is constrained 
by their wealth and by the existence of immigration policies that limit (or encourage) 
the entry of persons into particular geographic areas (Borjas, 1996). No single, unified 
theory of immigration that simultaneously addresses all these issues yet exists.  
Instead, a number of theories or hypotheses have been developed to explore each (or a 
specific aspect) of the various questions individually.  
Neoclassical economists focus on the focus on differences in wages and working 
conditions between countries as the costs of migration. According to Borjas (2000), 
migration decisions are guided by the comparison of the present value of lifetime 
earnings in the alternative opportunities. The worker moves if the net gain is positive. 
                                                           
6
 Borjas, G. J. (1989). “Economic Theory and International Migration”. International Migration 
Review, Vol. 23 (3), Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 
90's, pp. 457-485, The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc. 
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The propositions that have to be examined in order the individual to migrate or not 
are: 
1. An improvement in the economic opportunities available in the destination 
increases the net gains to migration, and raises the likelihood that the worker moves.  
  2. An improvement in the economic opportunities at the current location 
decreases the net gains to migration, and lowers the probability that the worker 
moves.  
  3. An increase in migration costs lowers the net gains to migration, and 
reduces the likelihood of a move. 
In sum, Borjas (2000) believes that “migration occurs when there is a good chance 
that the worker will recoup his human capital investment”. This means that, migrants 
will tend to gravitate from low-income to high-income regions, and the larger the 
income differential between the regions or the cheaper it is to move, the greater the 
number of migrants. 
On the other side, Stark & Bloom (1985)7, with the theory of the New Economics 
of Labour Migration react to the proposals of the neoclassical theory and add to the 
factors that restrict the decision for migrations, factors not only related to the labour 
market.  
In a different framework is being set the theory of dual labour markets, a 
macroeconomic theory, which regards migration as a result of the labour market 
demand of the contemporary industrialized economies. Piore (1979)8, a staunch 
supporter of this theory, believes that migration is not an outcome of low wages and 
high levels of unemployment coming from the sending countries of immigrants, but 
rather is caused by conditions that prevail in host countries.  
Finally, one completely different theory of migration, which is considered to be a 
dynamic nature theory, is the theory of migration networks, according to which 
                                                           
7
 Stark O., Bloom D. (1985). “The New Economics of Labor Migration”. American Economic Review. 
1985, 75, p. 173-178. 
 
8
 Piore, M. J. (1979) Birds of passage: Migrant labor and industrial societies. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge and New York. 
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immigration has mainly many social foundations, with the formation of migrant 
networks to be probably the most important. As Massey (1990)9 states,  networks 
build into the migration process lead to its growth over time, in spite of fluctuating 
wage differentials, recessions, and increasingly restrictive immigration policies in 
developed countries.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
9
 Massey D.S. (1990) “The social and economic origins of immigration”, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 510, p. 60-72. 
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3. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF LABOUR 
MOBILITY IN THE EU  
In a Europe that has no internal borders and competes most of global economy, 
the changing needs of its aging society and the rapid changes in its labor market, 
demand much higher levels of mobility. The mobility is an essential tool for effective 
functioning of single market and is essential for the possibility of more people to find 
better employment. Workers should have greater mobility among jobs ("job 
mobility") and between regions or Member States ("geographical mobility”). 
Prerequisite is the development of the right skills that will provide the European 
citizens the opportunity to change frequently jobs and to advance their professional 
career. This is the main objective of commonly agreed principle of flexibility10, a 
concept that can help workers manage successfully their job rotation, enlargement or 
mobility in periods of accelerating economic changes. 
3.1. Labour Mobility & Legal Framework 
Mobility of workers in a European-wide labour market has been a primary 
objective since the creation of the European Community. Free movement as a right 
has existed since the foundation of the European Community in 1957. It is enshrined 
in Article 39 of the EC Treaty and has been developed by secondary legislation, 
particularly Regulation 1612/6811 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community and Directive 2004/38/EC on the right to reside.  
Article 3912 of the EC Treaty that governs the free movement of workers ensures: 
• the right to seek employment in another Member State, 
• the right to work in another Member State, 
• the right to reside for that reason,  
• the right to stay there, 
                                                           
10
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/ITALY/LABOURFLEXIBILITY-IT.htm  
11
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31968R1612:EN:HTML  
12
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E039:EN:HTML  
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• equal treatment concerning access to employment and working conditions.  
Article 39 EC applies to the so-called migrant workers, i.e. EU nationals who 
leave one EU country to go work in another EU country. It also applies to EU 
nationals who return to their country of origin after having exercised this right to free 
movement but it does not cover persons who have never left their country of origin. 
There are moreover certain rights which are extended to family members of the 
worker. The family members have, in particular, the right to live with the worker in 
the host Member State and the right to equal treatment as regards for example 
education and social advantages. Some members of the family have also the right to 
work there.  
Also concerning the right of free movement of workers of the 10 new Member 
States, from, to and between the EU countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia) and on 1 January 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania) may be restricted 
during a transitional period of maximum seven years after accession. These 
restrictions only concern the freedom of movement for the purpose of taking up a job 
and they may differ from one Member State to another.  
3.2. Labour Mobility & Single Market 
Labour mobility is an essential tool for effective functioning of single market. The 
Single Market has been one of Europe’s defining achievements as it is meant to 
deliver jobs, growth and greater choice and prosperity for Europe’s citizens and 
businesses. It came into effect in January 1993 and works on the basis of four 
freedoms - the free movement of goods, labour, services and capital throughout the 
EU. This means, for example, that companies can buy and sell goods without them 
being subject to barriers to trade, that people can work in any member state with their 
qualifications recognised, that services such as banking may be used across member 
states, and that capital and currencies can move freely. All Member States of the EU 
are part of the Single Market, even if they have not joined the euro13.  
                                                           
13
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/een/index_en.htm 
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Freedom of movement existed since the foundation of the European Community 
in 1957. With the 1957 Treaty (Treaty of Rome), the European Economic Community 
was established making possible the abolishment of customs barriers within the 
Community and the establishment of a common customs tariff to be applied to goods 
from non-EEC countries. This objective achieved on 1 July 1968. In June 1985, the 
Commission, under its then President, Jacques Delors, published a White Paper 
seeking to abolish, within seven years, all physical, technical and tax-related barriers 
to free movement within the Community. The aim was to stimulate industrial and 
commercial expansion within a large, unified economic area on a scale with the 
American market. The enabling instrument for the single market was the Single 
European Act, which came into force in July 1987. Its provisions include beside other 
the gradual establishment of the single market over a period up to the end of 1992, by 
means of a vast legislative programme involving the adoption of hundreds of 
directives and regulations. Finally in 1993, the single market becomes a reality. From 
1993 until now the single market helps to bring down barriers, create more jobs and 
increase overall prosperity in the EU. The Commission presents and regularly updates 
the Internal Market strategy, which sets out a long-term strategic vision and 
framework for improving the functioning of the Single Market14.  
3.3. Labour Mobility & EU Policies 
3.3.1. Lisbon Treaty 
Labour mobility is considered to be the key of Lisbon Strategy. The Lisbon 
Strategy was launched in 2000 as a response to the challenges of globalisation and 
ageing. The European Council defined the objective of the strategy for the EU "to 
become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 
2010 capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion and respect for the environment". In order this to be achieved, through 
the Lisbon Strategy and the European Employment Strategy the geographic and job 
mobility were considered as an important factor for creating jobs and developing the 
                                                           
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_2_en.htm   
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employability and adaptability of the EU workforce in rapidly changing labor 
markets. 
Taking stock five years after the launch of the Lisbon strategy, the Commission 
found the results to date somewhat disappointing, and the European economy to have 
failed to deliver the expected performance in terms of growth, productivity and 
employment. Job creation had slowed and there was still insufficient investment in 
research and development. The date of 2010 and the objectives concerning the various 
rates of employment were thus no longer put forward as priorities. According to the 
“Lisbon Strategy review 2005 – 2008”15, the policy priorities the Commission set, 
intended to:  
◦ invest more in human capital by improving education and skills, 
◦ improve the adaptability of the workforce and business sector, and 
increase the flexibility of the labour markets in order to help Europe 
adjust to restructuring and market changes, 
◦ attract more people to the employment market and modernise social 
protection systems.   
3.3.2. Action plan for skills and mobility 2002 - 2006 
Achieving the objectives established in Lisbon in March 2000 of more and better 
jobs, greater social cohesion and the creation of a European area of knowledge 
requires a skilled and adaptable labour force on more open and more accessible 
European labour markets. Thus, on February of 2002 the European Commission 
approved the “Action Plan on skills and mobility 2002 – 2006”16. According to this 
plan, in order to be achieved progress on mobility of European workers from 2002 
until 2005, the Commission proposed the following priority actions:  
 strengthening of occupational mobility and skills development, 
  improving information and transparency on job opportunities,  
                                                           
15http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/growth_and_jobs/c11325_en.
htm  
16http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/lifelong_learning/c11056_en.htm  
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 facilitating geographic mobility. 
The 2002 Action Plan also proposed to be declared the year 2006 as European 
Year mobility. 
3.3.3. Action plan for job mobility 2007-2010 
After the final report17 of the project: “Action plan for skills and mobility for the 
period 2002 – 2006”, which was published on the 25th of January of 2007, the lessons 
that were to be learned from this project and the key areas where the efforts have to 
continue are: 
 more responsive education and training market work and            
prepare citizens for mobility through learning language,  
 remove legal and administrative barriers and promoting cross-
border recognition of qualifications,  
 and creating a single information portal for the mobility-based 
job matching system at EURES18. 
Based on the above lessons learned and the close relationship between labour 
mobility and several topical policy issues, such as flexibility with security, lifelong 
learning, multilingualism and demographic change, Commission launched an action 
plan for job mobility for 2007-2010.  
The objectives of this Action Plan19 are:  
                                                           
17
 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 25.1.2007, COM(2007) 24 final, Report from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: “Final Report on the Implementation of the 
Commission's Action Plan for Skills and Mobility COM(2002) 72 final”.  
18
 EURES is a Job Mobility Portal that has a human network of more than 700 EURES advisers. The 
purpose of EURES is to provide information, advice and recruitment/placement (job-matching) 
services for the benefit of workers and employers as well as any citizen wishing to benefit from the 
principle of the free movement of persons. The main objectives of EURES are: 
- to inform, guide and provide advice to potentially mobile workers on job opportunities as well as 
living and working conditions in the European Economic Area 
- to assist employers wishing to recruit workers from other countries and 
- to provide advice and guidance to workers and employers in cross-border regions (source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eures/home.jsp?lang=en). 
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  Improving existing legislation and administrative practices governing 
the mobility of workers, providing policy support for mobility from 
authorities at all levels,  
 strengthening the EURES as the preferred instrument of single and 
integrated support to facilitate the mobility of workers and their 
families, 
 promoting awareness of the possibilities and advantages of mobility 
among the wider public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19
 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 6.12.2007, COM(2007) 773 final, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: “Mobility, an instrument for more 
and better jobs: The European Job Mobility Action Plan (2007-2010)”.  
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4. LABOUR MOBILITY IN EU 
4.1. Implementation of Labour Mobility in EU 
The Lisbon Agenda, with its aim of making the EU the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, remains very prominent in the 
European policy discourse. There is a strong belief that increased opportunities for 
Europeans to change residence and/or jobs more freely can contribute to this aim. 
Mobility can assist in ensuring that EU citizens ‘work to live’ and improve their 
quality of life, as well as assist in strengthening social cohesion within Europe and 
assuring the sustainable development of European society in general.  
The importance of mobility to European policymakers is evident from the decision 
to designate 2006 as ‘European Year of Workers’ Mobility’. To learn more about the 
extent of European citizens’ geographical and job mobility, and their future intentions, 
the European Commission funded a special Eurobarometer survey20, which was 
carried out at the end of 2005, covering 24.000 EU citizens living and working in the 
25 Member States then forming the Union. The European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions conducted the analysis of the data in 
cooperation with the Commission, looking at the drivers of, and barriers to, mobility 
in Europe, and the economic and social effects of mobility patterns. Below are the 
results of this survey and also findings of other researches that were based on the 2005 
data of the Eurobarometer survey, the more recent Eurobarometer report of the period 
November - December 200921 and other relevant European Commission’s sources.  
4.1.1. Levels of Labour Mobility in EU 
The overall picture of geographical mobility gained from the Eurobarometer data 
is that Europeans are not very mobile. Long-distance mobility is not common: only 
                                                           
20
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006). “Mobility in 
Europe”. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/59/en/1/ef0659en.pdf 
21
 Special Eurobarometer 337 (2010), “Geographical and labour market mobility”. Report, Fieldwork 
November - December 2009, European Commission. 
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18% of Europeans have moved outside their region, while only 4% have ever moved 
to another Member State and 3% outside the Union. However, almost a quarter have 
moved within their region. This level of mobility is frequently contrasted with the 
levels of geographical mobility seen in the US, where almost a third of citizens (32%) 
live outside the state in which they were born, substantially more than the 22% of 
Europeans who have ever lived in another region or Member State. However, 
migration between states in the US takes place within the same linguistic, political 
and cultural context, unlike long-distance migration in Europe. 
As far as it may concern the levels of job mobility, the Eurobarometer survey 
looked at the relative proportions of people who had never changed employer after the 
age of 35 years (this age was chosen to balance the fact that younger people may 
never have had the opportunity to change jobs). The levels of job mobility are 
considered to be low, but not as low as those of geographical mobility. Across the 
EU25, 23% of respondents had never changed employer.  
One of the main findings of this study that has to be mentioned is that job mobility 
and geographical mobility are clearly related, as a majority of moves across regions or 
borders are made for job-related reasons. The findings on geographical and job 
mobility can thus be combined to form a composite picture of European mobility. 
Across Europe, it would seem that levels of geographical and of job mobility 
coincide: in countries that have high levels of geographical mobility, people tend to 
change jobs more often. 
4.1.2. Why is Labour Mobility so important for the EU? 
The present EU member states are facing a daunting demographic outlook. 
Population projections reveal that a decrease in population size is expected in virtually 
all EU countries over the next 50 years. For example, the EU-15 population, which in 
2000 was nearly 100 million larger than that of the US, is anticipated to become 
smaller relative to the US by 20 million in 2050, as the figure below indicates. In 
addition to the decrease in population size, EU is undergoing a relatively rapid 
population ageing process. Given the demographic challenge of decreasing natural 
population growth and an increasing average age of the EU population, job mobility 
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and migration have become increasingly necessary to fill job and skill shortages 
across Europe22. 
Figure: 4.1 EU-15 population growth versus US23  
 
An also frequent argument for the necessity of increased intra - EU mobility is 
that it will bring about stronger integration of Europe. The European integration 
process is premised on the free movement of capitals, goods, services and persons. 
The low levels of labour mobility remain a serious problem, given that labour 
mobility is a crucial adjustment mechanism for macroeconomic shocks – 
demographic, demand-driven, or even technological – affecting European economies 
in different ways and at different times (so-called “asymmetric shocks”). So in the 
aftermath of an adverse economic shock, there are main types of adjustment 
mechanisms available to a region or a country. Labour mobility is one of them. While 
an external adjustment mechanism – as the depreciation of the national currency – in a 
monetary union as this of the European Monetary Union is not possible, labour 
mobility, as also capital adjustment (mobility) and net fiscal transfers (i.e. lower tax 
                                                           
22
 Larsson, A. (April, 2004), “A New European Agenda For Labour Mobility: Report of a CEPS-ECHR 
Task Force”, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies.   
23
 Larsson, A. (2004).  
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contributions or higher gross transfers), can lead to optimality so as EU to correspond 
quickly to economic cycles and to absorb efficiently the asymmetric shocks, coming 
this way closer to the convergence of real prices – unemployment rates, wages and 
wealth - 24.  
According to the findings of IZA Research Report of 200825, that was conducted 
based to the 2005 Eurobarometer data, there are indirect evidence on the correlation 
between intra – EU migration and European integration. The following table shows 
the marginal effects obtained from of a regression explaining the pro-pensity of 
individuals thinking that moving across regions and countries within the European 
Union is “a good thing for European integration” on a full set of individual 
characteristics including indicators of past migration experience. 
Table: 4.1 Factors Impacting Positive EU Integration Attitudes 
 
The results indicate that besides socio-demographic characteristics, notably 
education, own experiences with moving abroad substantially affect the view on 
geographic mobility as a factor fostering European Integration. In fact, individuals 
                                                           
24
 Janiak, A. & Wasmer, E.. Economic Papers 340 / September 2008. European Economy: Mobility in 
Europe – Why it is low, the bottlenecksand the policy solutions. European Commission, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Communities. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications  
25
 IZA Research Report No. 19, July 2008, “Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising 
its Economic and Social Benefits”, Bonin H., Eichhorst W. et al., by IZA, NIRAS Consultants, AMS. 
Available at: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_19.pdf  
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who moved at least once in their lifetime within the EU are 5.3 percent more likely to 
answer that mobility is good for integration, than comparable individuals without such 
a move.    
4.1.3. Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility 
From an economic point of view, higher levels of geographical mobility are 
associated with higher rates of GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates 
of long-term unemployment. Greater geographical mobility also seems to be 
associated with fewer regional labour market imbalances. While it is not possible to 
establish a causal relationship on the basis of this, it is highly significant that such 
geographical mobility is not associated with lower GDP or rates of employment. 
Similar positive associations are seen at the microeconomic level. Job related inter-
regional mobility is associated with greater individual labour force participation, 
higher employment rates and better access to employment on permanent contracts. 
Inter-country migration appears to improve the employment opportunities for those 
moving for job-related reasons. As far as it may concern the benefits of job mobility, 
at the macroeconomic level, greater job mobility is associated with higher rates of 
GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates of long-term unemployment. 
While it is not possible to establish a causal relationship on the basis of this, it is 
highly significant that job mobility is not associated with lower GDP or rates of 
employment26. 
From a social point of view, a geographical move and/or change of residence can 
lead to a better job (at least subjectively), with consequent greater motivation and 
satisfaction for the individual. In addition, it can prevent the social exclusion caused 
by unemployment. But just because mobility delivers benefits, it is not correct to say 
that more mobility is always a good thing. Moving region or country poses challenges 
to individual citizens, their families, employers and wider societies. One of the 
possible negative effects of such a move is the loss of social networks, which may 
lead to the need to purchase services, such as childcare or care for elderly and 
dependant relatives; in turn, this can lead to additional costs for services that were 
                                                           
26
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2007). “Foundation 
findings: Mobility in Europe – The way forward”. Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2007/03/en/1/ef0703en.pdf  
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previously supplied by the wider familial or social network. Another negative effect 
could be the arising of difficulties in coordinating the employment careers of both 
spouses, with consequences for the household and its work–life balance27. A very 
serious negative consequence of labour migration happens when younger and better-
educated workers migrate, which is a fact that represents a substantial loss to a 
country or a region – a so-called ‘brain drain’, something that could result to a depress 
of productivity growth and eventually of economic growth in the sending country.28 
In order mobility to deliver its potential benefits over the long term, it has to 
balance these externalities. In other words it has to become an optimum mobility. In 
theory, the optimum level of geographic mobility is to be found, where the net 
benefits are at the maximum, i.e. at the level of geographic mobility maximizing the 
distance between the level of total benefits and the level of total costs29. According to 
the above, geographic labour mobility is considered to be the tool that can lead to a 
more balanced allocation of jobs and workers in the EU. Optimality seems also to be 
the key for the desirable levels of labour mobility in EU, according to the analysts of 
the 2005 Eurobarometer survey, as they also agree with the notion of optimality. They 
state that the EU should focus not on how to reach a maximum level of mobility, but 
rather on how to realize the optimal mobility for workers, companies and societies. 
The key is not more mobility but rather better mobility. If, for example, geographical 
mobility would result in a severe loss of cohesion within communities, it should not 
be promoted, equally, if people are forced to change one precarious job for another, 
job mobility is not something to be welcomed. 
4.1.4. Europeans Intentions regarding Mobily 
But despite low labor mobility, more and more powerful arguments argue that 
people are more willing to move than in the past. According to the 2005 
Eurobarometer survey, 57% of the respondents reported that mobility among regions 
and countries is useful for European integration, 46% consider it a positive factor for 
labor markets and the individual and 40% to benefit the economy, while these 
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 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006). 
28
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2007). 
29
 IZA Research Report No. 19, July 2008. 
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percentages increased between the period 2006 – 2009, as the Eurobarometer report of 
2010 indicates, with the Europeans to be more likely (60%) to think that people 
moving within the EU is a good thing for European integration, 50% to think it is a 
good thing for the labour market, and 47% to think it is a good thing for the economy, 
noting that although 48% of the Europeans think that moving around is a good thing 
for individuals, when it comes to the impact on families people are less certain.  
Moreover the Eurobarometer data of 2005 revealed that 5,5% of EU-10 reported 
that they are likely to move to another Member State over the next five years. Also 
intentions for future mobility within Europe had until 2005 increased in all Member 
States to varying degrees. But this situation changed during the last four years. More 
particular, as the Eurobarometer report of 2010 indicates, since autumn 2005 overall 
willingness to move decreased most dramatically in countries as Greece (down from 
67% in 2005 to 38%), Italy (down from 68% to 39%) and Poland (down from 73% to 
45%), while also further five countries saw decreases of 15-25 percentage points: 
Portugal (down 22 points), Belgium (down 20 points), Germany and the Czech 
Republic (down 18 points) and Slovakia (down 17 points) in comparison to the 
percentage points of 2005. So although Europeans in 2009 believe more in labour 
mobility, they seem to be less willing to move than they used to be. 
A more revealing picture is presented in the table below, which shows the 
breakdown of Europeans’ intentions to move in terms of destination until the year of 
2005. Almost 7% of the EU population is expected to move to another region within 
the next five years and 3% within the EU. Looking at demographic correlates, 
findings indicated that intentions to migrate within the EU were greater among men; 
people under 35 years of age; the better educated and students and unemployed people 
(who, on average, showed somewhat higher intentions to move to all five 
destinations). Note that in the Eurobarometer survey of 2005, when respondents were 
asked that if they were unemployed would they be ready to move to another region or 
country in order to find a job, only 30% said no, 5% did not know, 29% said they 
would be ready to move to another region only, and 5% to another country only. The 
rest (31%) answered they would be ready to move to either another region or another 
country. But these percentages have changed and more specifically decreased during 
the last four years. 
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Table 4.2:  Mobility intentions by demographic characteristics (%)  
 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2006. 
 
As it is been reported in the Eurobarometer report of 2010, almost one quarter 
(23%) would be ready to move to another country or region, when in the previous 
study the relative percentage was 31%, 18% would only move to another region in 
their country when in the previous study the relative percentage was 29%, and 7% 
would only consider moving to another country, when in the previous study the 
relative percentage was 5%, showing a slight rise. In spite - or perhaps due to the 
worsening economic climate since autumn 2005, in general Europeans are now less 
willing to move if they become unemployed and are unable to find a job where they 
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live. In fact, the proportion willing to move to another region and/or country has 
decreased from 66% to 48%. The most dramatic decrease has been among those 
willing to move to another region within the same country - down from 29% in 
autumn 2005 to 18%, as the figure below indicates30. 
Figure 4.2 Question 20. “If you were unemployed and had difficulties 
finding a job here, would you be ready to move to another region or country to 
find one?”31 
 
Furthermore, the Eurobarometer 2005 results show - as the figure below indicates 
- a clear split between four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) on the one side, with a fairly low level of basic intended EU-internal 
mobility rate of between 2-3%, and on the other side the three Baltic countries and 
Poland with a relatively higher level of basic interest to migrate in the next five years 
of between 7%-9%. Also comparing old and new Member States, the four high 
mobility countries in the former EU-15 (the three Nordic countries and Ireland) have a 
significantly higher future intention to migrate than the citizens in the four low 
mobility NMS-8 countries. 
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 Special Eurobarometer 337 (2010). 
31
 Special Eurobarometer 337 (2010). 
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Figure: 4.3 EU-internal mobility potential next five years 
 
Source: Krieger, H. & Fernandez, E.32 
 
Table 4.3 Countries with mobility intentions above/below EU average33 
It has to be noted that 
as far as it may concern the 
EU mobility potential, as 
the Eurobarometer report 
of 2010 reveals, during the 
past four years – from 2006 
until 2009 - the countries 
for which the share of 
citizens envisaged to work 
abroad remained almost the 
same, with few exceptions. 
                                                           
32
 Krieger, H. & Fernandez, E.. “Too much or too little long-distance mobility in Europe?”, EU policies 
to promote and restrict mobility. Foundation seminar on worker mobility. Available at: 
http://www.migration-online.de/data/mobility4paper2006.pdf  
33
 Special Eurobarometer 337 (2010). 
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4.1.5 Profile of mobile Europeans 
The results of the Eurobarometer study (2006) revealed furthermore the profile of 
mobile European citizens, both based on demographic characteristics and also based 
on nationality. As table 4.4 below shows, from the results of past intra-EU mobility 
levels it became clear that gender differences are small in terms of distance of past 
movement. In terms of age, the oldest age group (people over 65) moved more within 
their town or city, but made fewer long-distance moves. But here, too, the differences 
are not dramatic. As expected, the youngest age group (which includes many 
students) is underrepresented in each distance-of-move category. As regards 
employment status, it appears that, in general, unemployed people – compared to 
those working or retired – have displayed less past mobility in almost all distance-of-
move categories. As far as it may concern the educational level, results showed that 
about 7% of the highly educated report moved within the EU since they left their 
parental home, compared to 4% among the lower educated. The results also revealed 
that people with high educational level are more mobile, as far as it may concern 
mobility across regions and within EU.  This could be attributed according to the 
analysts of the Eurobarometer survey, to willingness to move for career reasons, even 
over long distances and between countries, which is much more part of the 
professional culture of highly educated workers than of less well-educated workers. 
So, the Eurobarometer mobility survey data of 2005 confirm that younger, higher 
educated cohorts are more internationally oriented than the older cohorts. Similar 
seem also to be the results concerning the profile of the mobile Europeans of the 
Eurobarometer’s report of 2010.   
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Table: 4.4 Past mobility level in distance moved, by demographic characteristics 
(%) 
 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2006. 
Furthermore, the next step of the analysis concerns past mobility in terms of 
country differences (see table 4.5). In general, geographical mobility is higher in the 
Nordic countries, by contrast in most of the NMS and in most of the southern 
European countries where mobility within or outside the region is relatively low. The 
two countries with the greatest intra-EU past mobility are Ireland and Luxembourg 
(followed by Cyprus). 
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Table: 4.5 Past mobility, by destination and by country (%) 
 
  Source: Eurobarometer, 2006. 
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4.1.6. Mobility Reasons 
As reported in the first chapter of this essay, most migration theories state that 
migration decisions are driven by personal expectations on income levels in the 
destination and sending countries and by the social and economic costs of migration 
(e.g. Borjas, 2000). Also, individuals form expectations on income levels at different 
destinations which are determined by the respective wage levels and employment 
opportunities (Harris and Todaro, 1970).  
The literature also suggests that income is not the only (and maybe not even the 
main) motivation for inter-regional mobility. One completely different theory of 
migration is the theory of migration networks of Massey (1990), according to which 
immigration has mainly many social foundations, with the formation of migrant 
networks to be probably the most important.  
Theories that refer to migration decisions seem not far from the reality. The 
Eurobarometer survey34, revealed the reasons for mobility according to the answers of 
the responders. As figure 4.4 shows, the three most important reasons for short-
distance moves (i.e. within town/city/region) are better housing (28%), a change of 
partnership or marital situation (23%) and the desire to own a home rather than rent 
(19%). Long-distance moves (i.e. outside region, within EU), however, are more often 
related to the labour market (new job or job transfer, 34%), a change of partnership or 
marital situation is also a key motive for moving (18%). The major reasons for having 
made short-distance moves in the past are similar for males and females.  
Generally, the most important reasons for mobility are more or less the same 
across birth cohorts. Thus, there is evidence that supports the idea that – besides the 
possibility for improvement of working (job) and living (housing) conditions – 
geographical mobility is related to life-course changes and, more specifically, to a 
change of partnership or marital situation. 
 
 
                                                           
34
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006). 
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Figure: 4.4 Reasons for short- and long-distance mobility (%) 
 
Source: Eurobarometer study, 2006. 
 
4.1.7. Barriers for Labour Mobility 
As recent researches indicate, labour mobility across the European Union remains 
still low. Mobility is considered to be rather limited due to the existence of various 
obstacles. The people, in addition to any uncertainty they feel for the benefits of 
mobility, they face different barriers to movement, such as: Legal and administrative 
barriers, housing costs and availability of housing, occupation of spouse / partner, 
portability of pensions, linguistic obstacles and issues of recognition of qualifications 
in other Member States. 
The 2005 Eurobarometer survey35 carried out in all 25 EU Member States 
revealed the following as far as it may concern the cross border mobility in Europe: 
                                                           
35Eurobarometer study (2005), “resume”. Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/36/en/1/ef0636en.pdf 
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About 2% of the workforce one of the 27 EU member states live and work today in 
another Member State, when by comparison, the percentage of third countries who are 
resident in the EU is almost double and only approximately 4% of the EU population 
has ever lived in another EU country while another 3% has lived in a country outside 
the Union.  
These results of low cross border mobility can be most likely explained by the fact 
that moving across borders involves the loss of social networks in the country of 
origin. It also involves the search for new employment opportunities and the learning 
of new language skills. Moving across EU borders is not only hampered by a variety 
of institutional and legal hurdles between Member States, but also by the fact that the 
decision to move is affected by cultural barriers and by the social costs of leaving 
one’s family, friends, colleagues and local community. It is also strongly influenced 
by the individual’s personal life-course stage (e.g. the presence of young children, 
having a working partner or job career phase). The decision not to move, therefore, is 
not, a priori, a sign of a lack of willingness to move; rather it is constricted by 
institutions, culture, networks and individual life-course trajectories and assessments. 
The figure below, derived from the analysis of the 2006 Eurobarometer survey on 
geographical and job mobility36, shows the factors that would discourage respondents 
from moving to another country (only people with no intention of moving). It 
indicates that the people with no intentions to move are basically put off by the fear of 
losing one’s social network (44% mention ‘losing direct contact with family and 
friends’ and 27% ‘missing support from family and friends’ as discouraging factors). 
It is interesting to note that these ‘social network factors’ are considered more 
important than the problem of having to learn a new language, usually  considered as 
one of the main factors limiting geographical mobility between EU countries. While 
these data show that it is an important factor, it is way below the fear of losing the 
support and contact of family and friends. Of less importance but also noted are 
housing conditions and health care facilities.          
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 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006). 
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Figure 4.5:  Factors that discourage people to move to another EU country 
(only people without moving intentions) 
Source: Eurobarometer study, 2006. 
Findings from the 2006 Eurobarometer study on mobility confirm the fact that 
geographical mobility poses important trade-offs for the individual, in terms of social 
and economic considerations. The main factor discouraging geographical mobility in 
the EU is the fear of losing one’s social network (family and friends).  
Apparently, the same results occurred from the Eurobarometer report of 2010, 
regarding the reasons which might discourage the Europeans from working abroad. 
Specifically, 39% of Europeans are discouraged from working abroad because it 
would mean leaving home. Concern for family and friends is also key - 27% do not 
want to impose large changes on their families, whilst 21% do not want to leave their 
friends. Finally, problems’ learning a new language is a disincentive for 19% of the 
European37. 
                                                           
37
 Special Eurobarometer 337 (2010). 
 34
According to another research, the Economic Survey of the European Union of 
200738, which was conducted by OECD, only 4% of the EU workforce has ever lived 
and worked in another member state. In this research, the language barrier is one 
explanation, but it is not the only one. Most of the policy obstacles seem to have been 
removed. The main exceptions are the transitional restrictions on migrants from the 
new member states. Around half of EU15 countries now give free access to workers 
from the ten countries that joined in 2004, but only two of them have fully opened 
their doors to workers from Bulgaria and Romania. Most of the new member states 
have granted free access. So far, enlargement has not led to the flood of migrants that 
was initially feared. While the overall level of migration has been rather modest, the 
inflow to some countries has been higher than expected, due mostly to their strong 
labour markets and the fact that they did not impose restrictions. These countries have 
benefited through better job matching, a reduction in structural unemployment and the 
easing of labour shortages.  
Experience showed clearly the negative impact of European, national, regional or 
local level obstacles to geographic mobility. Apart from the legal and administrative 
obstacles, e.g. in social security sector, mobility is hampered by practical constraints 
in areas such as loss of family bonds, housing, languages, employment of spouses / 
partners. But there are other factors deterrent to mobility, such as the non-recognition 
of experience mobility to improve career prospects. These barriers are related to 
issues that have to be addressed at different levels: local, regional, national and EU 
level39. 
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 Economic Survey of the European Union, September 2007, OECD. Available at:     
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4.2. Labour mobility in the enlarged EU 
The free movement of workers was defined as one of the four fundamental 
freedoms of the then European Economic Community as early as the Rome Treaties 
of 1957 and was fully implemented by the six founding members of the Community 
whose joint population numbers 180 million in 1968. In the course of the Eastern 
enlargement round, eight Central and Eastern European countries (NMS-8)40 and two 
other countries (Cyprus and Malta) joined the EU on May 1st, 2004, and another two 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania (NMS-2), acceded at the 1st of January, 2007. While 
the rules of the Internal Market for the free movement of workers have been 
immediately applied for citizens from Cyprus and Malta, transitional arrangements 
have been agreed for the NMS-8 and the NMS-2. These transitional arrangements 
allow the EU member states to postpone the free movement of workers up to a 
maximum period of seven years.41 
 The transitional provisions are divided into three different phases: At first, in the 
two years following accession, all member states can apply national rules on access to 
their labour markets, at the end of this two-year period, each member state can choose 
to apply national rules for another three years or implement the Community rules 
regulating free labour mobility in the EU. If the countries decide to apply the 
Community rules, a safeguard clause allows for the possibility to reintroduce work 
permits temporarily in case of a labour market disturbance. There will be an automatic 
review by the European Commission before the end of the two+year period and a 
further review on request of each affected member state, but the decision on the 
application of transitional periods is left to the national governments. At the end of the 
five year period, a member state can prolong the transitional arrangements for another 
two years only  if it experiences (or are “threatened” by) ‘serious disturbances’ in its 
labour market.42 
                                                           
40
 NMS-8 are New Member States of the European Union that joined in 2004 (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). 
41
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 European Integration Consortium, Nuremberg 2009, “Labour mobility within the EU in the context 
of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements”, by Herbert Brücker et al.. Labour 
Mobility - Final Report. 
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4.2.1. Migration Flows from the New Member States (CEEC’s, Romania & 
Bulgaria) to the EU-15 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 not only increased the chances of workers to 
find jobs but also the opportunities for employers to find employees. In the study of 
European Integration Consortium of 200943, it was examined the impact of the 
transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers on the sending and 
receiving countries. The available data suggested that foreign population from the 
eight new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (NMS-8) and the foreign 
population from Bulgaria and Romania (NMS-2) increased the migration flows in the 
EU.  
More specifically, as table 4.6 below indicates, the number of foreign residents 
from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 has increased from 893,000 persons in the year before 
Eastern enlargement (2003) to 1.91 million persons of the EU-15 by the end of 2007. 
This corresponds to an annual increase of 250,000 persons on average since Eastern 
enlargement compared to 62,000 persons in the years from 2000 to 2003. Since the 
beginning of Eastern enlargement in 2003, almost 70 per cent of the immigrants from 
the NMS-8 have been absorbed by the UK and Ireland. These two countries have 
replaced Austria and Germany as the main destinations for migrants from the NMS-8. 
The stock of foreign residents from the NMS-8 increased from approximately 95,000 
to about 609,000 in the UK since 2000 according to the LFS (Labour Force Survey) 
data and from 43,500 to about 179,000 persons in Ireland since 2004, as the table 
below indicates. In contrast, Austria and Germany experienced only a modest increase 
in the number of foreign residents from the NMS-8 during the 2003–2007 period. The 
stock of foreign residents from the NMS-8 has increased by about 30,000 persons in 
Austria. Germany has revised its migration statistics in 2004 such that the actual 
increase cannot be calculated properly.  
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Table: 4.6 Foreign residents from the NMS-8 in the EU, 2000-200744 
What can be concluded according to the research team that prepared the study of 
the European Integration Consortium of 2009, is that the above evidence suggests that 
the high share of migrants from the NMS-8 in Ireland and the UK can partly be 
attributed to the selective application of transitional arrangements for the free 
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 Herbert Brücker et al. (2009). European Integration Consortium. 
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movement of workers by these countries. Other factors, such as the increasing English 
language proficiency particularly among the young cohorts in the NMS, favourable 
labour market conditions and flexible labour market institutions, and the declining 
costs of distance, have facilitated the diversion of migration flows to these 
destinations as well.  
Meanwhile, immigration from Bulgaria and Romania into EU-15 countries is 
restricted in most of them. Nonetheless, the number of foreign residents from there 
has increased from 279,000 persons in 2000 to 1.86 million approximately by the end 
of 2007. This corresponds to an annual increase in the number of residents of about 
226,000 persons. As far as it may it concern the stock of NMS-2 immigrants in the 
new member states it stagnates at about 79,000 persons, as table 4.7 below indicates. 
According to the research team that prepared the study of the European Integration 
Consortium of 2009, the main destination countries for Bulgarian and Romanian 
migrants are Italy and Spain, while immigration from Bulgaria and Romania has been 
facilitated by bilateral agreements between them and Spain and Italy and the 
legalization of immigrants there. Spain is the main destination for migrants from the 
NMS-2 at a migration stock of about 829,000 persons, followed by Italy with about 
659,000 persons, as the table below shows. 
It has to be mentioned at this point that the researchers of this study stress that the 
figures presented here refer to legal migration only. Incentives for illegal migration 
are high in case of Bulgaria and Romania, since legal immigration opportunities are 
limited. Anecdotal evidence suggests that actual migration stocks from the NMS-2 in 
the EU-15 are substantially higher, but reliable evidence is missing. 
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Table: 4.7 Foreign residents from the NMS-2 in the EU, 2000-200745 
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4.2.2. The Fundamental Economic Conditions for Labour Mobility in the 
Enlarged EU 
According to neoclassical labour market economics, in a macro economical level, 
the basic motive in order someone to migrate to another country are wage differences 
between countries, while migration of labour force will continue to happen until the 
wage of the two countries – home and host country - to become the same. In other 
words through the migration of labour force the income between those two countries 
ideally tend to converge. Also migration creates consequences in the employment / or 
unemployment rate. The exchange of labour force between the home and the host 
country leads to a possible convergence of the employment levels in both countries, 
even if this variation of employment is not in absolute terms. Furthermore, the 
reduction in labour supply in the country of emigration will lead to a reduction on the 
production growth (Λιανός & Νταούλη-Ντεµούση, 1998).  
Against this background there are listed below some fundamental macroeconomic 
factors which characterize the migration conditions in the member states of the EU. 
All these factors have been taken from the research of the Final Report about Labour 
Mobility of the European Integration Consortium of 2009 46 and several data of 
Eurostat related to the labour market of the EU. As a natural starting point first it is 
presented the current income gap that exists within the enlarged EU. Moreover, it will 
be presented the convergence of per capita GDP and wage levels which took place in 
the course of Eastern enlargement. Then it will be described the labour market 
conditions in the EU and the NMS and the convergence of employment opportunities. 
Regarding the income gap between the EU-15 and the new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe measured at purchasing power parity standards (PPS)47, 
Eurostat estimates the GNI per capita in the ten new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe (NMS-10) at 48 per cent of that in the EU-15 in 2007. The GNI per 
capita of the eight new member states (NMS-8) which joined the EU in 2004 
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 Herbert Brücker et al. (2009). European Integration Consortium. 
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 The PPS (purchasing power standard) is an artificial currency unit that reflects differences in national 
price levels that are not taken into account by exchange rates. This unit allows meaningful volume 
comparisons of economic indicators between countries (Source: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Purchasing_power_standard_(
PPS).  
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amounted to 53 per cent at PPS in 2007, and that of Bulgaria and Romania to about 34 
per cent of that in the EU-15, as the table48  4.8  below indicates. 
At the same time, as the research team that prepared the study of the European 
Integration Consortium of 2009 about labour mobility in the enlarged Europe report, 
purchasing power parity estimates tend to understate monetary incentives for labour 
mobility, since migrants can consume a part of their earnings in their home countries 
or remit a part of the income to their families. Consequently, differences in earnings at 
current exchange rates may affect migration decisions as well. At current exchange 
rates, the GNI per capita of the NMS-10 amounted to slightly more than one quarter 
of that in the EU-15 in 2006. The GNI per capita at market prices of the NMS-8 is 
reported to be at 31 per cent in 2007, and that of the NMS-2 at 17 per cent49. 
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Table: 4.8 GNI per capita, hourly gross wages and salaries and net migration in 
the EU, 200750 
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Similar is apparently the variety of GDP per capita levels between the EU-15 and 
EU-27. Although they differ, there is strong evidence that during the last years and 
after the enlargement GDP per capita levels between EU countries have began to 
converge. More specifically, according to Eurostat data51 the GDP per capita for 2005 
in the member states ranged from 48% to 251% of the EU25 average. GDP per capita 
in Luxembourg, expressed in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS), was more 
than twice the EU25 average in 2005, while Ireland was about 40% above the 
average.  
Figure: 4.6 GDP per capita in PPS, EU25=100 
The Netherlands, Austria, 
Denmark, Belgium, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden were 
between approximately 15% 
and 25% above the average. 
Finland, Germany and France 
recorded figures about 10% 
above the EU25 average, while 
Italy and Spain were around the 
average. Cyprus was about 10% 
below the EU25 average, while 
Greece and Slovenia were 
around 20% below. The Czech 
Republic, Portugal and Malta 
were around 30% below the 
EU25 average, while Hungary, 
Estonia and Slovakia were 
about 40% below. Lithuania, 
Poland and Latvia were around 
half of the EU25 average. 
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As figure 4.6 shows, during the period 2003 – 2005 the GDP per capita levels in 
PPS between the old and the new member states of EU have started to converge with 
the most of the old members to eliminate the gap and only a few of them to enlarge it 
(e.g.  Luxembourg   - from 237 in 2003 to 251 in 2005, or Finland from 109 in 2003 
to 111 in 2005)  and definitely with all the NMS-8 and NMS-2 to have increased their 
GDP per capita levels.  
More recent data of Eurostat52 show that the convergence of GDP per capita in 
PPS between EU countries - albeit slowly - continues to happen. More specifically, 
the GDP per inhabitant in Finland, France, Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Greece, was 
within 10% of the EU27 average. Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium were between 15% and 35% 
above the average, while the highest level of GDP per inhabitant in the EU27 was 
recorded in Luxembourg. Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia 
were between 10% and 30% lower than the EU27 average. Hungary, Estonia, Poland 
and Lithuania were between 30% and 50% lower, while Latvia, Romania and 
Bulgaria were between 50% and 60% below the EU27 average.   
Figure: 4.7 GDP per inhabitant in PPS, 2009, (EU27=100) 
 
 Source: Eurostat, News Release, 91/2010, 21 June 2010. 
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Furthermore, it must be noted the fact that apart from the gap that exists in the 
GNI per capita and GDP per capita, the wage gap seems to be even larger. Increasing 
labor mobility across the EU and the growing weight of remittances from abroad in 
households’ income seems to have triggered a faster nominal convergence in wages 
and prices, in comparison to real prices. The report of European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions of 2008, entitled “Pay developments 
– 2007”53 considering the pay trends in Europe in 2006 and 2007, found that average 
collectively-agreed nominal wage increases across the EU rose from 5.6% in 2006 to 
7% in 2007. However, taking into account rising inflation, the rate of real increase fell 
from 2.7% in 2006 to 2.3% in 2007.  
As far as it may concern the NMS-10, the same report indicated that in 2002, the 
average real pay increase in the NMS-10 was 4.7 times higher than in the EU15. This 
ratio fell to 2.9 in 2003 and 1.4 in 2004, which might have been seen as indicating a 
degree of convergence around the EU enlargement of that year, but it then rose 
steeply to 5.8 in 2005, 6.3 in 2006 and 20.5 in 2007 (including Bulgaria and Romania 
among the NMS has relatively little effect on the figures). In 2006, the pay-rise 
differential between the old and new EU was more than twice as large in real terms as 
it was in nominal terms, and in 2007 it was more than five times as large, reaffirming 
that there is increasingly a ‘two-speed’ Europe in terms of wage trends54. 
One appropriate indicator which can reflect to some degree the price levels for 
wages in each economy is the minimum wage. Minimum wages vary considerably 
between EU countries, especially those of the more developed countries in 
comparison to those of the new member states. The graph below shows clearly this 
difference concerning the minimum wages in PPS for 2009, with the differences 
between the level of wages in EU-15 and NMS to be approximately even 6 times 
larger.  
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Figure: 4.8 Monthly Minimum Wages, 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat, Pocketbooks, Labour market statistics, 2009 edition.  
The labour market conditions, as far as it may concern the unemployment rates 
between the EU-15 and the new member states, have also converged during the last 
years. According to the forecasted data of Eurostat55 unemployment rates both in the 
NMS-8 and the NMS-2 match the average unemployment rates in the EU-15. More 
specifically, as the table below indicates, the forecasted total unemployment rate of 
2009 for EU-27 is 8.9 (%) and the corresponding for EU-16 is 9.4 (%). In the long 
term unemployment rates are formed at 3.0 (%) and 3.4 (%) respectively, which 
undoubtedly indicates the convergence of prices level and of employment 
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opportunities, although it has to be mentioned that imbalances in unemployment rates 
between specific countries exist.  
Table 4.9: Unemployment and unemployment rates, by country and sex, 2008 - 
200956 
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As a brief conclusion, one might say that reducing regional differences in terms of 
income, wealth and unemployment, EU envisage that by diminishing the labour force 
and mobility in depressed areas of the EU and increasing it in flourishing regions 
would make a difference in the aim of an even economic development across Europe. 
But what reality indicates is that EU of 27 looks different in what concerns the levels 
of income, wealth and unemployment, with the convergence of prices to constitute a 
long-term process. 
Closing, it should be noted that beyond migration, other dimensions of economic 
integration such as capital mobility from the old to the new member states and the 
increasing trade between the old and the new EU member states have certainly 
contributed to the convergence of prices, but such an analysis is beyond the remit of 
this paper. 
4.2.3. The Macroeconomic Impact of Eastern enlargement on the EU-25  
Apart from analysing only the migration flows, or the convergence or not of the 
level of prices among the EU countries following EU enlargement, a study that 
concerns labour mobility has to be focused on estimating the potential 
macroeconomic consequences - economic costs and benefits of labour migration – for 
the EU-15, the EU-10 and for the EU-25 as a whole. Neoclassical economic theory 
suggests that migration is beneficial for everyone, when assuming a labour shortage in 
the host countries and excess labour in the sending countries. According to these 
theories, immigration eliminates the scarcity of labour in the host country, reduces 
possible inflationary pressure from wage growth in receiving countries and leads to a 
better use of productive capital. At the same time, the home country also benefits 
from a removal of unemployment and through the receipt of workers’ remittances, 
and migrants themselves benefit through higher wages57. 
But is the picture really as positive as suggested by neoclassical economics? The 
research team that prepared the study of the European Integration Consortium of 
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200958 about the macroeconomic consequences of labour mobility in the enlarged 
Europe during the period 2004 - 2007 reports the following: according to table 4.10, 
immigration from the NMS-8 to the EU-15 increases the GDP of the enlarged EU in 
the short-run by about 0.11 per cent and in the long-run, after the adjustment of capital 
stocks, by about 0.20 per cent. Also, while the GDP in the EU-15 increased by about 
0.26 per cent it fell in the NMS-8 by about 1.10 per cent in the long-run something 
that is not surprising since the first group of countries received additional labour and 
after the adjustment of capital stocks, additional capital. The reverse holds for the 
sending countries. As far as it may concern the GDP per capita, it tends to rise in the 
receiving countries. More precisely, the GDP per capita tends to increase in the 
sending countries about 0.65 per cent in the short-term, while it remains largely 
constant in the receiving countries. What seems to be more important is that the total 
gross factor income of natives in the receiving countries increases in the long-run, 
about 0.10 per cent and about 0.05 per cent for the sending countries while also in 
total. About the unemployment rate, it declines in the sending countries as a natural 
consequence of the outflow of labour. The same holds true for the entire EU since 
migrants tend to move out of countries or regions with an unemployment rate at or 
above the average level of the enlarged EU and move to countries having 
unemployment rates below the EU average. Finally, migration seems to affect 
aggregate wages only in the short-run. At the average of the EU-15, wages decline 
slightly by about 0.1 per cent, but increase in the sending countries by about 0.3 per 
cent in the short-run. 
In relation to the macroeconomic impacts of the migration from the NMS-2 during 
the same period, it had its difficulties. The research team contrasted the Eastern 
enlargement migration flows with a no EU enlargement counterfactual here, since the 
NMS-2 joined the EU not before 2007. The results revealed almost the same situation 
compared to the NMS-8, as far as it may concern the migration effects, based on the 
same macroeconomic values.  
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To sum up, reality showed that in the long-run there are positive migration 
impacts concerning GDP, GDP per capita and factor income indexes, while the 
possible side effects of migration – unemployment and decrease on aggregate wages – 
seemed not to affect negatively, but rather neutrally the evolution of the migration 
process.   
Table: 4.10 The macroeconomic impact of migration from the NMS-8, 2004-
200759 
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5. THE CASE OF THE U.S.A. 
It is widely known that the population of the United States is a highly mobile. This 
indicate surveys that have been conducted approximately the last four decades in the 
U.S..  Borjas et al. (1990), note that since the 1960s, approximately three percent of 
the population moves across state lines in any given year, and 10 percent of the 
population moves across state lines in a five-year period, stressing that extensive 
internal mobility implies that migration has become an increasingly important source 
of demographic change in the various regions and a major determinant of concurrent 
changes in regional economic growth of the U.S.. And so this economic growth 
became a reality in the United States, as during the 1970’s the U.S. economy created 
more than 20 million jobs60 and the movement of employment away from the goods-
producing sector into the service-producing sector was accelerated.  
5.1. Domestic/Internal Geographical Mobility in the U.S. 
Movement of people from one location to another at any geographic scale affects 
both the origin and the destination locations.  When the rate of natural increase is low, 
an increasing share of population change may be attributed to migration, whether 
domestic or international.  Domestic (or internal) migration is the movement of people 
within national boundaries, whereas international migration refers to movement 
across those boundaries.   
Geographic mobility has long been an important aspect of American life, affecting 
both people and geographic areas. At an individual level, moving has a number of 
potential impacts, such as expanding economic opportunity or increasing residential 
satisfaction.  The movement of people is a key demographic factor for any area’s 
population trends, and can change its demographic and socioeconomic composition.  
Finally, a federal state as this of the U.S.A., as well as private industry, need to 
understand who moves and why when planning for needed services, facilities, and 
businesses.   
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The U.S. Census Bureau, which operates as the leading source of quality data 
about the U.S.A. nation's people and economy, conducts every year surveys related to 
the issue of geographical mobility/migration of the US. According to the report of 
200461 between the period 2002 – 2003, 40.1 million United States residents moved, 
fewer than the 41 million who moved between 2001 and 2002, as the table below 
demonstrates. Similarly, moving rates have declined slightly over the past decade, 
from 17 percent in 1994 to 14 percent in 2003.   
Table: 5.1 Annual Moving Rates by Type of Move: 1993 to 200362 
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Figure: 5.1 Percent Distribution of Movers by Type of Move: 2002 to 2003 
According to the same 
report, in 2003, 59 percent of 
all moves were within the same 
county, while 19 percent were 
to a different county within the 
same state, 19 percent were to a 
different state, and 3 percent 
were from abroad, but previous 
similar studies, as this of 1994, 
showed that 62 percent were 
within the same county and just 
16 percent of all moves crossed state boundaries. This indicates an increase in levels 
of migration flows between states through the 2000’s in comparison to the previous 
decade. 
Furthermore, in the United States, according to Census data of the total period 
from 1990 until 2004 and the respective report of 200663, over 22 million people were 
domestic migrants who changed their state of residence between 1995 and 2000. Of 
these domestic migrants, approximately half relocated to a state in a different region. 
This movement did not affect all states equally, however inmigration (migration into 
an area during a given period) and outmigration (migration out of an area during a 
given period) levels varied widely, with markedly uneven results across the country. 
The report indicates that the American South remained the primary destination for 
migrants within the United States, with average net inmigration of 353,000 annually 
(a rate of 3.4 per 1,000) between 2000 and 2004. But while these were the highest 
figures of any region, they reflect a modest decline from even higher migration 
figures for the 1990s, when net inmigration averaged 380,000 per year (a rate of 4.1 
per 1,000). This decline was due entirely to steep declines in net inmigration for the 
East and West South Central divisions. As far as it may concern the Northeast, it 
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continued to experience net outmigration between 2000 and 2004, but at lower levels 
than during the 1990s. 
Table: 5.2 Total and Average Annual Domestic Net Migration for Regions 
and Divisions: 1990–2000 and 2000–200464 
 
 
5.2. Levels of Labour Mobility in the U.S.  
Why do people move? Most social scientists agree that there are a combination of 
economic and noneconomic reasons for moving that vary depending on the time 
period and the age of the movers.  From a relevant scientific research that was 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau65 for the period 1999 – 2000, the following 
results are revealed.  
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Table: 5.3 Reason for Moving: March 1997-1998, March 1998-1999, and March 
1999-200166 
 
As shown in Table 5.3, between March 1999 and March 2000, the highest 
percentage of people moved for housing-related reasons (52 percent), followed by 
family (26 percent) and work-related reasons (16 percent). Within these major 
categories, most moved for a “new/better house/apartment” (19 percent), followed by 
“other family” reasons (13 percent), “other housing” reasons and “to own home/not 
rent” (12 percent), and then by a “new job/job transfer”(10 percent). These results are 
very similar to those found in the respective surveys of 1998 and 1999.  Rankings 
were the same among the four major groupings, (1) housing, (2) family, (3) work, (4) 
other, and no more than 5 percentage points separated results for any of the 3 years.  
Among the more detailed response categories, except for “cheaper housing” and other 
“other” reasons, no more than 2 percentage points separated any of the 1998 and 2000 
results, as the table above shows.  
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So it is obvious that the factor “work-related” reason is not one of the main 
reasons that the Americans decide to move. But another finding related to labour 
mobility is that work-related reasons seem more likely to be the incentive for long-
distance moves - moves across county boundaries - (intercounty), while short distance 
moves – moves within a county - (intracounty) are more likely to be made for 
housing-related reasons. More specifically, the figure below shows that between  
Figure: 5.2 Reason for Moving by Type of Move: March 1999 - 2000 
March 1999 and March 
2000, the proportion of 
moves made for family-
related reasons was 
about the same for intra- 
and intercounty moves, 
but there were dramatic 
differences for housing- 
and work-related 
moves. Only 6 percent 
of intracounty movers 
cited a work-related 
reason, compared with 
31 percent of 
intercounty movers. 
More than two-thirds of 
work-related, long-
distance movers moved 
for a new job or job transfer. Conversely, 65 percent of intracounty movers cited a 
housing-related reason, compared with just 32 percent of the intercounty movers.  
Among housing reasons, the largest percentage-point differential between short- and 
long-distance movers was for those moving to live in a new or better house or 
apartment (24 percent to 10 percent). 
A second finding concerning mobility for work-related reasons, is that educational 
levels are related to why people move, with the highly educated to be more likely to 
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move for employment-related reasons. The data in the table below, confirm that the 
greater one’s education, the greater the likelihood that one moved for work-related 
reasons. Additionally, increases in education decrease the likelihood that one moved 
for family-related reasons. More specifically, in 2000, only 14 percent of  
Table: 5.4 Reason for Moving by Educational Attainment and Type of Move:  
March 1999-200067 
 
high school graduates moved for work-related reasons, compared with 25 percent of 
those with a bachelor’s degree and 28 percent of those with a masters degree or 
higher.  Most of this difference comes from those starting a new job, for instance, 7 
percent of high school graduates compared with 17 percent of those with bachelor’s 
degrees.  Similarly, 31 percent of those with a high school education moved for 
family-related reasons, compared with only 22 percent of those with a bachelor’s 
degree. Housing-related reasons remained the most frequent response given. 
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Finally, the survey revealed that reasons for moving are quite similar for the 
employed and unemployed, with no more than 6 percentage points separating the 
groups on any of the major categories. As the table below indicates, within work-
related reasons, 10 percent of the employed moved for a new job, compared with just 
6 percent of the unemployed, while only 1 percent of the employed moved to find 
work, compared with 4 percent of the unemployed.  
Table: 5.5 Reason for Moving by Employment Status: March 1999-200068 
 
Finally, what it seems to be more important for the Americans is not just the high 
levels of labour mobility – something that is more or less given -, but mobility from 
the perspective of economic growth and income distribution. This is obvious if 
someone look at researches of the more recent years. McMurrer & Sawhill (1996), 
state that economists now understand that the amount of mobility is just as important 
as the distribution of economic rewards in any given year, because it determines the 
extent to which inequality in the short term translates into inequality over the long 
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term. The “relative” economic mobility in U.S. has been remarkably stable, with the 
income growth to be still unequally distributed between the Americans. Although the 
incomes of American families change frequently, while some of the poor get richer, 
some of the rich get poorer, and for a variety of reasons: accumulation of job skills 
and experience, marriage and divorce, job change, addition or loss of a second pay 
check, and business success or failure, and despite this churning, overall rates of 
economic mobility in the United States have not changed over time.  
So while income inequality in the U.S. grows, and income maximization seems to 
be the ultimate goal for the average American, the question is why would the 
Americans really want to move intracountry? In a country that since its nation’s 
founding, the promise of economic opportunity has been a central component of the 
American Dream and grew to be the world’s biggest and most dynamic also held out 
the promise that hard work, vision, and risk—regardless of family background—
would be rewarded, the answer seems to be obvious. And while the American dream 
is a part of this nation’s belief and ideology, today as income inequality and slower 
economic growth exist, the idea of the American Dream is being questioned69. 
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6. COMPARING MOBILITY IN EU AND US                                                   
Comparing interstate moves in the US with cross-border moves in the EU 
suggests that mobility in the EU is very low. As relatively recent European 
Commission’s data indicate (table 6.1), in the former EU15 (prior to EU enlargement 
in 2004 and 2007), only about 0.1% of the working age population changes its 
country of residence in a given year. Conversely, in the US, about 2.3% of the 
working age population moves to a different state every year, which represents a 
substantial difference when compared with the EU figures.  
Table: 6.1 Labour Mobility: U.S. vs. Europe70 
 
The 2006 Eurobarometer survey71 data also showed that about 22% of the EU 
population has ever lived in another region or country, among which only 18% have 
ever moved outside their region, while the percentage for cross-border migration is 
especially low with only 4% to have ever moved to another Member State. These 
rates normally lead to the assumption that this level of mobility is too low in 
comparison to the relative mobility rates of the US, where around 32% of the US 
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population does not live in the state in which they were born72, as the figure below 
shows. Of course what should be noted for these differences in the level of labour 
mobility is that movement within the USA takes place within the same country, 
language area and culture – not as the case of intra-EU movement. So a part of the 
EU–USA difference in mobility rates can be explained by the fact that the costs of 
mobility are likely to be higher in the EU due to language barriers, cultural 
differences, transferability of social security rights and recognition of educational 
degrees.  
Figure: 6.1 Comparison of the level of long-distance mobility in EU and 
US 
 
Source: Krieger, H. & Fernandez, E. 
But, at this point, what Krieger & Fernandez73 stress to their analysis based on the 
findings of the Eurobarometer survey of 2006, is that it should be noted that the 
general EU level of geographical mobility only represents an average of the very 
different levels of long-distance mobility in each EU Member State. The differences 
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between countries in this respect are quite significant, as the figure below show. In 
general, Nordic countries show the highest overall levels of mobility (around 40% of 
the working age population have lived in a different region or country), followed by 
Ireland and the UK– countries with a relatively liberal welfare regime – with a 
mobility level around 30%, in Central Europe, the levels of mobility are around the 
EU average of 20%, except for France which has quite a high mobility level (30%).  
At the bottom are southern European countries with an average mobility level of less 
than 15% and the former communist Member States with a level of around 10% long-
distance mobility. 
Figure: 6.3 Past Patterns of Long-Distance Mobility in the EU 
 
Source: Krieger, H. & Fernandez, E. 
Finally, the two analysts conclude that it is not entirely correct to be said that the 
levels of mobility in Europe are too low, as the mobility rates in at least five EU 
countries have been as high as in the US or even higher, wondering if common macro 
economic conditions are the key for this convergence. 
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Another recent report74, based on the conclusions from the seminar on labour 
mobility which was coorganised by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions and the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
in 2007, notes that comparison as far as it may concern geographical mobility trends 
in Europe and the US is not without difficulty. The participants of this seminar 
pronounced that there are several parameters that have to be counted for the validity 
of this comparison. These parameters are developed below. 
First parameter that should be considered is that the US is a federal state, while the 
EU is not. Moreover, the US is one nation, while the EU comprises many countries. 
Freedom of movement in the US is as old as the country itself, while it has only 
become a recent possibility in the EU. Freedom of movement for the EU existed since 
the foundation of the European Community with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. But, for 
the United States the legal regime is conducive of mobility since the Constitution of 
1789 and the constitutional “Right to Travel” (…). The elements of what that actually 
means were summarized by the United States Supreme Court (…) in 1999:  
The “right to travel” discussed in our cases embraces as least three 
different components.  It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter 
and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor 
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, 
the right to be treated like other citizens of that State75.  
 
A second point of comparison is the labour legislation which is different in the US 
compared to the EU, and furthermore the various EU Member States still have 
different labour legislation. In the US, some states are far more generous than others 
in terms of laws and programs affecting economic security, such as minimum wage, 
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worker compensation, and unemployment compensation as there are also significant 
differences in the extent of other labour-protective laws, e.g. governing physical well-
being and respect for individual dignity and liberty. However, according to the view 
of the researchers 76, there is rather little systematic evidence of what bearing these 
differing schemes have on labour mobility, if any, as Minnesota for example, is far 
more generous and protective than Indiana, but that fact alone has not induced droves 
of workers to leave Indiana for Minnesota. On the contrary, although among the 
member states of the European Union also exist differences concerning the labour 
legislation, the level of minimum wages (see figure 4.8 Monthly Minimum Wages, 
2009) and labour market conditions in general (level of unemployment, different 
levels of employment opportunities e.t.c., see table 4.9 Unemployment and 
unemployment rates, by country and sex, 2008 – 2009), these differences are 
considered to be barriers for the cross-border mobility from the European citizens, 
according to the Eurobarometer survey of 2006 based on the data of 2005 77. More 
specifically, 43% of the respondents reported employment-related problems as a 
factor that would discourage them from moving to another country, while about 13% 
mentioned possible difficulties about the transferability of their pension rights and 
also about 14% mentioned that they would expect poorer access to public facilities 
(such as access to healthcare or social benefits). 
Moving across EU borders is not only hampered by a variety of institutional and 
legal hurdles between Member States, but also by the fact that the decision to move is 
affected by cultural barriers, as the European citizens report in the Eurobarometer 
survey of 2006 – based on the data of 200578. More specifically, when respondents 
were asked what they thought would be the greatest difficulties they would have to 
face if they did want to move to another EU country, on average, about 67% of the 
EU population answered the language or culture-related difficulties, when this kind of 
barrier does not exist in the US.  
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At this point it has to be noted another difference that occurs from this 
comparison. The US workforce may be more mobile but seemingly not for reasons 
relating to the labour market (see table 5.3 Reason for Moving: March 1997-1998, 
March 1998-1999, and March 1999-20001). As it seems only around 16% of the 
Americans who migrate move for “work-related” reasons, while in EU mobility is 
more closely related to employment related factors (around 35% for long distance 
moves – out of the region), as it is considered to be a precondition to improved 
employment and for the successful labour market integration of the European citizens, 
although family and housing related issues are considered to affect mobility (around 
25 and 30 % respectively), but mostly for short distance mobility (within town, city or 
region)  (Eurobarometer survey, 2006)79. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that all the above differences between the levels of 
mobility and in particular labour mobility in the US and EU are deriving from the fact 
that each state implements structural different policies in such issues. More precisely, 
mobility and migration in relation to the US way of thinking are related to market 
imperfections and above all to free choice of workers and employers. There is no 
unique or guiding role from the federal government. Mobility in the US policy 
tradition is primarily of a laissez-faire nature. Nevertheless, this absence of policy 
intervention does not imply that mobility is considered an unimportant issue. On the 
contrary, being mobile and moving to where jobs are more abundant, is at the heart of 
American history and culture. In a sense, the US is highly supportive of mobility and 
thus encourages migration. However, mobility is seen as the outcome of free market 
choices of the two main stakeholders in the labour market: employers and employees. 
In this case, no distinct role is played by the government. Nonetheless, the US 
government seeks to adapt other policy interventions – such as training programmes 
or unemployment insurance benefits – to accommodate market outcomes and 
imperfections, but it does not seek any specific mobility target. To sum up, from a US 
perspective, the role of the free market receives greater emphasis, while the European 
perspective highlights the role of national governments and not only in promoting 
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mobility but also in linking mobility policies to social, economic and technological 
policies80.  
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7. DISCUSSION 
Labour market mobility, between jobs and/or between Member States or at 
regional level is considered to be an important tool of EU’s achievement of economic 
integration. But as it has been reported in this essay the levels of labour mobility still 
remain low, causing serious problems, given that labour mobility is a crucial 
adjustment mechanism for macroeconomic shocks – demographic, demand-driven, or 
even technological – affecting European economies in different ways and at different 
times (so-called “asymmetric shocks”). In a context of asymmetric shocks, European 
Commission has produced a number of policy recommendations aimed at improving 
the efficiency of labour market adjustment. Also the lack of mobility in particular has 
been emphasized forcefully through several reports, which argue that labour mobility 
can play an important role as an adjustment mechanism in European Monetary Union 
(EMU), especially in the event of permanent shocks requiring a reallocation of 
production factors such as a decline in the working-age population due to ageing 
sectoral and structural changes related to globalization or technological change, or 
regional differences in structural unemployment81.  
In classical economic theory, when asymmetries occur, in order economies to be 
protected from varying negative economic conditions between states, they use the 
exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. But this is impossible to happen in a 
monetary union, since exchange rates are fixed and there is a “one size fits all” 
interest rate policy. So, asymmetric economic shocks can be addressed – among other 
strategies – through the combination of stable exchange rates from the one hand and 
wage reductions and labour mobility from the other. When the benefits of this strategy 
exceed the costs, then according to Mundell (1961)82 and his optimal currency area 
theory, a state should join a monetary union. And while the main cost of the adoption 
of a single currency in a monetary union as the European Union, is the loss of the 
major macroeconomic tool, which is the independent exchange rate, the benefits that a 
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monetary union as EMU can enjoy, are the high levels of economic and trade 
integration that in any case mean high levels of capital and labour flexibility and 
mobility (Hix, 2005).  
However, economists suggest that EU is not an optimal currency area (Hix, 2005), 
as the main indicators of Mundell’s theory of optimal currency area, such as 
homogeneity, flexibility, mobility and fiscal transfers (McKay, 1999), seem not to 
help EU to correspond quickly to economic cycles and not to absorb efficiently the 
asymmetric shocks. According to McKay (1999), the high levels of unemployment, 
the inflexibility of prices and wages and the low degrees of labour mobility, seem to 
have led in the past the post-EMU 11 closer to divergence rather than convergence 
and the EMU away from rather towards optimality. 
The same year a report of IZA institute83, the purpose of which was to evaluate 
whether labour mobility is likely to act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism in the 
face of asymmetric shocks in Euroland, concluded that labour mobility is extremely 
unlikely to act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism for the EMU. To the same 
conclusion reached several empirical results of relevant researches84 conducted the 
last two decades, with the results of them to indicate that although labour mobility 
does not act as an effective adjustment mechanism, however continuous integration 
might lead to more similar economic structures and thus reducing the possibility of 
having asymmetric shocks inside EU. Further integration, although at a slower pace, 
might generate more symmetric shocks across Europe. However, until significant 
results are obtained, major reforms focused on increasing inter-sectoral and inter-
regional labour mobility are needed. 
In the field of reforms, many things could be done to increase labour mobility in 
Europe. First, the harmonisation of professional degrees could be furthered. Second, 
tax systems could be harmonised. Third, to be achieved better co–ordination of the 
social insurance system. A factor increasing the mobility of the unemployed would be 
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to condition unemployment benefit entitlement on the readiness to accept a job in the 
entire EU, not just in the particular nation state the unemployed person is a citizen of. 
Fourth, a common language that is spoken and understood by all Europeans is 
essential for a large number of workers to move between nation states. All workers in 
the EU would therefore have to be fluent in one common language85. 
But despite the recent developments in the adoption of common minimum 
legislation requirements at EU level in the fields of working and employment 
conditions and the information and consultation of workers, the EU has not yet 
achieved to force its member states to adopt common labour market policies (Hix, 
2005).  
Finally, unfortunately today, there are fears that due to the current global 
economic crises, the EU moves towards the establishment of an insecure working 
environment posing the risk of “social dumping”86 that will possible cause negative 
consequences, as the imposition of common, low social and labour standards to the 
“poorer” member-states of the European Union, will eventually lead EU for one more 
time closer to divergence rather than convergence.  
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8. CONCLUSION 
In a Europe that has no frontiers, and is now competing in the arena of global 
economy, the changing needs of our aging society and the ongoing labor market 
trends require much higher levels of mobility. Labour mobility is an essential tool for 
effective functioning of single market while it is also essential for many people as it 
provides them the opportunity for better employment, which is a key objective of 
Lisbon strategy. Labour market mobility, either between jobs and/or between Member 
States or regions is an important component of Europe's response to demographic 
change and globalization. The purpose of this essay was to present an integrated 
approach of EU’s labour mobility – in comparison also to US labour mobility - as its 
necessity is considered to be nowadays very important and crucial for the 
achievement of European integration.  
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